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This post was originally published on this site.

 

The Donald Trump administration has used the threat of a “public charge” to suspend visas for immigrants from 75 countries. However, the US government’s own economic data paints a more complex picture. While Indonesia is not on the list, the Indonesian diaspora and families are not entirely excluded from the policy’s maelstrom.

President Donald Trump’s administration has a simple-sounding criterion for selecting potential immigrants: those coming to the United States should be able to support themselves.

“ Immigrants must be financially self-sufficient and not be a financial burden to Americans,” the United States Department of State stated in its official explanation of immigrant visa policy.

That principle was one of the foundations of a controversial policy in January 2026. The State Department stopped issuing immigrant visas to citizens of 75 countries deemed at high risk of relying on American public assistance.

Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Nigeria, Iran, Russia, and Somalia are on the list. Indonesia is not.

What is questioned then is not only who is on the list, but also the government’s basis for including them.

Who is Called a Burden on the State?

In American government terminology, a public charge isn’t just a poor person. The State Department defines it as someone who relies primarily on the government for their living expenses.

Indicators include receipt of cash assistance such as Supplemental Security Income, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, local government general assistance, or state-funded long-term institutional care.

The Trump administration has taken a tougher stance. “Those who wish to obtain a US immigrant visa must be capable of demonstrating that they will be a benefit, rather than a burden, to our nation,” the State Department stated in an explanation of Public Charge Bonds last August.

The question is, is the use of public assistance enough to conclude that immigrants as a whole are a burden on the American economy?

The US government’s own data suggests the answer is not that simple.

Numbers Tell a Different Story

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), a nonpartisan agency of the US Congress, once calculated the fiscal impact of the immigration surge. The results actually showed a benefit to the federal treasury.

The CBO estimates that increased immigration could increase federal government revenue by about US$1.2 trillion between 2024 and 2034. Additional spending and interest costs over the same period are estimated at about US$300 billion.

On net, increased immigration is projected to reduce the federal deficit by about US$900 billion over a decade.

Working population growth is also expected to boost the economy. The CBO projects that America’s gross domestic product will be higher in 2034 than in a scenario without a surge in immigration. These figures, of course, cannot be used directly to evaluate the 75 countries on Trump’s list. Populations and calculation methodologies differ.

But CBO data reveals something often lost in political debate: immigrants aren’t just users of government services. They’re also workers, consumers, and taxpayers. Therefore, the question of who constitutes a “burden” on America is far more complex than the origin of a person’s passport.

 

When Passports Become a Measure

That question ultimately reached the courtroom. On August 21, 2026, United States District Judge Jeannette Vargas in Manhattan overturned the policy against 75 countries. Her language was unambiguous.

Vargas called the policy “patently unlawful,” blatantly contradicting the law. According to his ruling, Secretary of State Marco Rubio had exceeded his constitutional authority.

The issue isn’t that the government is prohibited from assessing whether an applicant has the potential to become a public charge . What’s at issue is how the government does so.

The law requires consular officials to review visa eligibility on an individual basis. The January policy instead mandates denials based on nationality, even for people who otherwise meet the visa requirements.

With this mechanism, a person’s passport practically becomes a proxy for assessing his or her economic risk.

Lawsuits against the policy were filed by immigrant rights organizations, visa applicants, and Americans who sponsor their family members.

The State Department finally acknowledged the consequences of the ruling. In an official update on August 28, the agency stated that as of August 21, the suspension of visa issuance for 75 countries “is no longer in effect.”

Indonesia is not included, but it is not necessarily far away.

Indonesia is not included in the list of 75 countries. However, there is another dimension that makes this issue relevant to Indonesians: the diaspora.

The Pew Research Center estimates that approximately 145,000 people in the United States will identify as Indonesian by 2023, using a broader definition of the Indonesian population. If only those who identify as Indonesian without any other racial or Asian identity are included, the number is approximately 80,000.

Of that second group, approximately 60,000 are immigrants. Seventy percent of Indonesian immigrants have lived in America for more than ten years, and 47 percent have become American citizens.

This is where the impact of immigration policy becomes cross-passport. An Indonesian citizen can marry a citizen of Thailand, Pakistan, Bangladesh, or any other country on the list. Indonesians who have become US citizens can also sponsor spouses or relatives of other nationalities.

Thus, a policy that does not formally mention Indonesia can still affect Indonesian families.

The Fight Is Not Over

The Vargas ruling does not mean that the concept of public charge is gone from the American immigration system.

In contrast, the State Department confirmed it is conducting a comprehensive review of its immigrant vetting policies to ensure they are not using social assistance illegally or becoming a public charge .

The government also operates a Public Charge Bond scheme . Under certain circumstances, applicants who were previously rejected due to public charge issues may be asked to provide a bond before a visa is issued.

This means the next battle will likely be less about the list of 75 countries and more about how much economic power determines who qualifies for American citizenship.

For Indonesians, the good news is simple: Indonesian passports are not on that list.

However, this case shows how an immigration policy made in Washington can spread across citizenship lines, touching spouses, children and families with different passports.

Judge Jeannette Vargas put the issue on a more fundamental level. In her ruling, she called the policy of denying visas to applicants who actually meet the requirements “patently unlawful.”

The ruling invalidated the list of 75 countries. However, the debate it left behind was much larger: when America determines who can join its borders, it should be the person, not just their passport, that should be examined.

If a person’s risk of becoming a burden on the state should be assessed based on their occupation, financial ability, and individual circumstances, how fair is it to use a country’s statistics as a measure for people who haven’t even been examined?

A federal court has dismissed one answer. Washington appears to be still searching for another.

Burhan Abe